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Chris, a 42-year-old white man from the U.S. West Coast, had been 
living in Japan for eight years when I spoke with him. During our three-hour 
semistructured interview he described a long line of bad luck, marked most 
memorably by a rocky U.S.-based employment record and a history of run-ins 
with the Japanese police. Despite these setbacks, he had recently been offered a 
lucrative, direct-hire, English teaching position by a local public school district. 
When marveling about his stroke of good luck, Chris presented a vision that 
was to reappear throughout my fieldwork with U.S. citizens working in Japan’s 
English teaching industry: the specter of Filipino labor threat. In his own words:
This job . . . two hundred people applied for and I got it, 
which is cool. But they confirmed for me also there’s all these 
people from non-native English-speaking countries who have 
master’s degrees, from the Philippines and stuff like that, and 
[they] have experience and they’re willing, they’re more than 
happy, to do it for chicken feed, because for them it’s not 
chicken feed.1
Chris’s focus on job qualifications betrayed a concern about whether his 
own checkered past would undermine his competitiveness. The key factor that 
presumably gave him a competitive advantage was his ability to uncomplicatedly 
30  Christina D. Owens
inhabit the category of “native English speaker,” an identification that he 
denied to people from the Philippines. During my two years of fieldwork in 
Nagoya’s English-language expatriate venues (2009–11), the ambivalent status 
of Filipino English ability routinely took center stage when the U.S. men I 
met cast Filipinos, and specifically Filipinas, as yellow peril harbingers of an 
impending loss of transnational white male privilege.
Recurrent anxieties about increasing Filipina presence within Japan’s 
English teaching industry highlight the confluence of multiple discursive 
histories of postcolonial inequality. The exclusion of Filipina/os2 from the 
native English teacher category aligns with the longue durée histories of 
colonialism and racism that have shaped who is imagined as a legitimate bearer 
of “western” knowledge and the worry about job competitiveness indexes 
rising concerns about neoliberal policies that have produced increasingly 
precarious living conditions for the majority of workers in Japan, a country that 
has been in an economic slump for more than two decades.3 On a demographic 
level, transnationally mobile Filipina migrants have become a potent sign of 
the flexibilization of the global labor market.4 The vast majority of Filipina/
os living in Japan are women (79%), while the majority of U.S. citizens 
working long-term in the country are men (≤73%).5 Hence, fearful responses to 
neoliberal scarcity that echo much older “nativist” desires to protect white male 
labor power in the United States take on new gendered meanings, while also 
intersecting with the historical traces of U.S. civilizing missions across Asia.
Asian American studies scholars have demonstrated that since the nineteenth 
century both Asian geopolitical spaces and mobile Asian bodies have served as 
phantasmic screens for the projection of fears about the loss of masculine, white 
integrity within the domestic United States. Whether portrayed as a deceptive 
seductress, an emasculated coolie, or an inhuman or infectious horde, “Asia” has 
served as a flexible amalgamation of racialized, feminized menace.6 At the same 
time, Asia has also been a central geopolitical arena for U.S. civilizing missions, 
which have transitioned from first saving Asians from supposed barbarism to 
later saving the region from the deleterious effects of Soviet influence and, more 
recently, rescuing Asian leaders from potential skepticism about free market 
globalization. In this way, Asians have alternately served as objects of fear and 
peril and as objects of U.S. rescue and education. Histories of U.S. engagement 
in both Japan and the Philippines have alternated between these twinned poles of 
racialized paternalism and racialized panic.7 When Filipina and U.S. migrants meet 
within the triangulated space of contemporary Japan, these discursive histories 
come together to create a uniquely “threatening” position for Filipinas, who can 
be imagined as employing the cultural traces of U.S. “benevolent assimilation” 
efforts (i.e., fluency in English and familiarity with U.S.-style customs and 
institutions) to compete with their former colonizers in a global marketplace that 
has naturalized the devaluation of racialized and feminized labor.
This case highlights how the gendering of colonial racial dynamics bleeds 
into the gendering of contemporary neoliberal precarity. Within neoliberal 
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globalization, Asian women have been cast as the ideal “‘flexible,’ ‘casual,’ 
‘docile’ workforce.”8 We must pay attention to this construction, which is key to 
understanding how U.S. American men experience Filipinas as threats. Especially 
for U.S. men working long term in Japan’s flexibilizing English language industry, 
desires to fulfill the role of heterosexual breadwinner underwrite fears of Filipina 
labor competition. Following Lisa Lowe in The Intimacies of Four Continents, I 
theorize “neoliberalism as imbricated in coloniality” and highlight the connections 
between different historical logics of feminized Asia.9 Race, nationality, and 
gender come together here to shape U.S. migrants’ concerns about economic 
opportunity in ways that both echo and update older versions of yellow peril, 
recasting racialized and gendered fears within a decidedly transnational frame of 
neoliberal scarcity and postcolonial encounter.10
This article demonstrates how, within the triangulated space of Japan, fears of 
endangered white male earning power are routed through 1) worried invocations 
of Filipinas’ liminal status as “colonial mimics” of the English language and 2) 
an implicit recognition of how Filipina labor has been unfairly devalued within 
the global economy. Despite these recognitions, it was often difficult for my 
informants to conceptualize the future outside of a white male victim narrative. 
If, as Homi Bhabha argues, “mimicry is at once resemblance and menace,”11 then 
fear of Filipina English ability highlights again how colonial relations remain 
structuring forces within neoliberal globalization’s affective economies.
During U.S. colonization of the Philippines, “benevolent assimilation” 
policies positioned Filipino men as infantilized colonial mimics—“little 
brown brothers” in need of American tutelage.12 However, as Bhabha argues, 
the “colonial authority” engendered within the call to mimicry is inherently 
unstable.13 In other words, benevolent assimilation holds within it the seeds 
of yellow peril. When imagined as a threat to contemporary “free” white male 
labor, the figure of the Filipina English teacher in Japan stands at the intersection 
of these two histories. As the feminized hybrid subject of “the yellow peril” and 
“the little brown brother,” Filipinas are positioned as beneficiaries of a U.S. 
paternalism that is in constant danger of losing its authority.
As bodies and ideas travel across time and space their meanings are 
simultaneously transformed and haunted by the past. The exclusionary logic 
of the “native English teacher” category echoes the anti-Asian “nativist” 
movements of the early-twentieth-century United States by transnationalizing 
visions of beleaguered American labor. At the same time, the specter of neoliberal 
postcolonial encounter allows for the transnational mobility of “white male 
victimhood” discourses that are a more recent phenomenon in the United States. 
As a form of backlash against the limited successes of the civil rights and feminist 
movements, these victimhood discourses often blame women and people of color 
for the effects of global economic restructuring.14 The “native English teacher” 
category, however, allows for the maintenance of U.S. white male privilege under 
the guise of supposedly race and gender-neutral market logics.
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In tracing such continuities, this article takes seriously Edward Said’s 
argument in “Travelling Theory” that, “no system or theory exhausts 
the situation out of which it emerges or to which it is transported.”15 
Methodologically, a focus on discursive mobility requires a cultural studies 
insistence on “radical contextualization,” alongside close readings of interview 
and fieldwork evidence.16 I explore both the specificity of the situation in Japan 
and the historical and theoretical continuities that link U.S. migrants to social 
dynamics in North America and to U.S. colonial endeavors in the Philippines. 
This approach brings together literatures that are not often in conversation, 
including American studies scholarship on masculinity, race, and empire and 
Japan studies scholarship on gender, labor politics, and U.S. influence. The 
analysis aligns with recent scholarship in transnational American studies by 
exploring how U.S. empire and racial and gender hierarchies shape affective 
economies and discursive milieus in North America and beyond.17
While other scholars of Asian/American studies increasingly ask the 
important question “How do Yellow Peril fears survive in the political culture 
of the U.S., Great Britain, and ‘the West’?”18 this article asks: How have yellow 
peril fears traveled, emerging in spaces outside of the United States, or “the 
West”? When made mobile, how do these fears intersect with and feed off the 
historical traces of U.S. cultural and economic imperialism? Given the realities 
of increased transnational mobility and triangulated postcolonial encounter, it is 
important that we consider cases like this one in Japan, where both the tenacity 
of yellow peril discourses and their adaptability to the neoliberal moment of 
postcolonial encounter become starkly visible. As white men from the United 
States try to make sense of what it means to “compete” with or work alongside 
former U.S.–colonial subjects while abroad, their anxieties index both the 
gender and race politics of neoliberal globalization, which relies so heavily 
on the systematically devalued labor of Asian women, and the discursive and 
material traces of U.S. colonial expansions.
In what follows I first present an overview of the race, nationality, gender, and 
labor politics of Japan’s increasingly precarious English language employment 
field before exploring how (post-)colonial anxieties coalesce around the 
“native English speaker” category. My fieldwork across multiple venues in 
the city of Nagoya (labor union, expatriate business groups, and expat bars) 
introduced me to a variety of perspectives on the changing job field. Overall, 
I conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews with sixty-five U.S. migrants 
living in the region, forty-two of whom were white men.19 After introducing 
how informants’ understood their own positions vis-à-vis Filipina competition, 
the article situates these anxieties historically and sociologically by considering 
how contemporary patterns of labor and migration connect to earlier colonial 
interventions in the Philippines. The article then examines how a multiplicity 
of “feminizations” haunt this case, instigating the transnational expansion of 
white male victimhood discourses. This analytical arc demonstrates how U.S. 
migrants in Japan can mobilize and make mobile the gendered and racialized 
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anxieties endemic to North American responses to neoliberalism, thus updating 
white nativist and backlash discourses for a new context.
Flexible Labor Regimes and Devalued Laborers
I was introduced to white U.S. migrants’ concerns about Filipino competition 
during the first meeting of the local English teacher’s labor union that I attended. 
While lamenting the regulatory loopholes that conversation schools and dispatch 
companies use to shortchange teachers of health care benefits, the white attendees 
twice cited Filipina/os as an ominous presence within the industry, a presence 
that could potentially contribute to decreased wages and lowered instructional 
standards for all. As documented in my field notes:
In response to the list of loopholes, union member Dan 
interjected on an optimistic note: “The contracts will become 
less lucrative and people will be less willing” to sign on. One 
unknown white guy across the table quickly averred, “Not 
native English speakers” but “Chinese, Filipinos,” and others 
will take the jobs. David, another union member, then focused 
specifically on Filipinos, noting that while their English isn’t 
“perfect,” “they can speak English better than Japanese 
people” can, and that is often enough to get the job.20
While the labor union itself aimed to organize and unite workers across 
race and nationality differences the vast majority of members and meeting 
attendees were white men from, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia. These men, like Dan and David who were both from 
the United States, often harbored understandable fears about the proliferation 
of dispatch, outsourced, subcontracted, and other contingent hiring schemes 
within the industry, a pattern that has become increasingly visible since the early 
naughts. Concerns about Filipino presence in the industry’s less prestigious, 
more feminized employment niches were shaped by this broader context of 
neoliberal restructuring and flexibilization of labor.
Devalued niches were visible in a diversity of English teaching employment 
sectors. Speaking about their specifically Filipina colleagues during both 
interviews and informal interactions, informants (union and nonunion members 
alike) subcontracted to teach in public schools noted that Filipinas were more 
often placed in elementary schools than in junior high and high schools. Some 
men implied that this was because Japanese employers considered “native 
speakers” better able to prepare junior high and high school students for 
their life-determining entrance exams. Although gender was not examined as 
a factor, this pattern also reflects the feminization and devaluation of early 
childhood education careers more broadly. When focusing on adult English 
schools, union members often noted that Filipina teachers were more likely 
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to be employed by companies that used indirect (subcontracted or dispatched) 
hiring schemes with lower salaries. Finally, some interviewees working within 
private preschools and cram schools noted that their Filipina colleagues were 
only ancillary teachers who oversaw playtime and warm-up exercises and had 
little input into curricular decisions and lesson planning. I did meet Filipina 
teachers who worked in more prestigious positions—at universities in Nagoya, 
for example—but my informants did not invoke these examples. Instead, 
Filipinas’ marginal economic and linguistic positioning took center stage as 
presumably intertwined phenomena.
Over the last three decades, scholarship within the field of TESOL (Teaching 
English to Speakers of Other Languages) has attempted to problematize the kind 
of exclusionary thinking that would (ideologically and economically) devalue 
Filipino English language abilities. Braj Kachru’s influential “World Englishes” 
model, for example, categorizes English speakers into three groups: “the inner 
circle” (Britain and its former settler colonies), “the outer circle” (postcolonial 
India, Singapore, the Philippines, etc.), and “the expanding circle” (countries 
where English is learned as a foreign language, like Japan).21 Although this 
classification scheme attempts to recognize and validate the diversity of Englishes 
spoken in our postcolonial era, by separating out postcolonial spaces it reproduces 
the very hierarchies it attempts to question. The use of the “native English speaker” 
category in Japan further problematizes this center-periphery model. Two of my 
older interviewees, Gabe and Nick, pointed this out, explaining that because they 
“weren’t considered native speakers,”22 Japanese employers would refuse to hire 
Filipinas unless their own U.S.-origin white male bodies stood in to vouch for and 
legitimate Filipina language ability. Nick even invoked Kachru’s terms, asking 
“are we going to hire blonde, blue-eyed Americans, or is it okay to hire people 
who are from, you know, ‘the expanding circle’?”23
Nick’s quick slippage from race (“blonde hair, blue eyed”) to self-
consciously air-quoted references to nationality represents a small-scale 
performance of the kinds of conflations endemic to discussions of inequality 
within Japan’s English industry. Gabe provided a similarly dense set of merged 
categories:
They [Japanese employers] only want white English-
speakers. And they can’t say that. . . . Of course if you’re 
a black person from the U.S., of course they’ll hire you. I 
mean, they’ll hire you because you’re American, basically. 
. . . [But] there’s lots of Filipino teachers looking for work 
because Japanese will not hire them. But if I go to a Japanese 
person to say, “Listen, I know you think most Filipinos can’t 
speak English, and maybe you’re right, but for some fluke 
she’s very good and I recommend her.” And then they take 
her. They will hire her.24
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Within Gabe’s awkward attempts at explaining the categories of privilege 
in Japan’s English teaching industry, we can hear echoes of the racialization of 
U.S. national belonging. In their reverberation across the Pacific these echoes 
continue to position African Americans as afterthoughts and white Americans 
as the normative center. Asian Americans and all other U.S. racial identities go 
completely unacknowledged, thus transplanting the black-white binary abroad. 
The normativity of U.S. American whiteness has been a constitutive part of 
hegemonic U.S.-Japan relations broadly conceived and, on a smaller scale, 
Japan’s English teaching industry in particular.25 While Britain and its western 
settler colonies are routinely constructed as racially distinct and linguistically 
homogenous (white and English-speaking) transnational labor pools, Jamaica, 
Singapore, India, and the Philippines, for instance, are implicitly written out 
of this labor pool, despite intersecting English-language traditions. Gabe’s 
awkward wording, far from being the idiosyncratic phrasing of one individual, 
points to broader social dynamics and performs the kind of discursive exclusions 
that plague the categories “American” and “native English teacher.”
Gabe’s use of feminine pronouns to describe his hypothetical Filipina/o 
English teacher represents one of the few times my informants used overtly 
gendered language to describe the dynamics of Filipina employment in the 
industry. This pronoun choice mirrors the very real gender skew of migrant 
demographics—over the last three decades Filipina women have moved to Japan 
in large numbers as sex workers and brides.26 While not overtly acknowledged 
by Gabe, his language choices index how gender, race, and nationality combine 
to construct him as a more desired and authoritative speaker of English. In 
describing how he worked as a middleman—subcontracting Filipinas out to 
Japanese employers who would otherwise not hire them—he also highlighted 
one of the routes through which some Filipinas come to inhabit more precarious 
and lower salaried employment niches in the first place.
While some white male U.S. migrants I interacted with feared that an influx 
of Filipinas into the industry might lead to a devaluation of the field overall, 
Gabe emphasized how nationality and race still create a privileged position 
for well-connected, older, white, U.S. American men like himself, even as 
flexible labor policies proliferate across the industry. After all, he was able to 
profit monetarily when placing Filipinas in teaching positions. Again, economic 
precarity is transnationally produced and stratified along lines of race, gender, 
nationality, sexuality, age, and class.27 Likewise, concerns about who has to live 
with precarity are also unevenly distributed.28 For most of my U.S. informants in 
Nagoya, the devaluation of racialized, feminized labor from the Global South was 
only worrying inasmuch as it threatened to downgrade their own market value. 
In this context, the “native English speaker” category provides a framework for 
legitimizing racial and imperial hierarchies by distinguishing between Filipina 
subjects and U.S. citizens. The “racial capitalism” at work within this iteration of 
U.S.-led globalization is haunted by traces of U.S. empire.29
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Native Speakers and Colonial Mimics
Homi Bhabha’s theorizations of “colonial mimicry” are especially helpful 
for understanding how Filipinas’ questionable (“non-native”) mastery of English 
potentially threatens U.S. “colonial authority” in contemporary Japan. With an 
“almost the same but not quite” mastery of English, Filipina mimicry incites “a 
discourse at the crossroads of what is known and permissible and that which 
though known must be kept concealed.”30 We can see this play of concealment 
and disclosure within Gabe’s narrative, as he provides no indication that he 
ever attempts to unilaterally address Japanese employers’ racist ideas about 
Filipina English ability. Instead, his description individualizes the skills of his 
particular Filipina employees as “flukes” and thereby encourages Japanese 
interlocutors to persist in their beliefs. After all, if Japanese employers were 
successfully convinced to reconsider their disdain for Filipina English teachers 
more generally, Gabe’s (colonial) authority within the employment hierarchy 
would be undermined—there would be little need for U.S. citizen gatekeepers 
to vouch for Filipina employability. As Japanese employers, in Gabe’s words, 
“cannot say” that they want to hire white English teachers, the discursive 
structure of colonial mimicry also requires that he conceal any recognition of 
generalized Filipina similarity to shore up his own authority.
I witnessed a comparable dynamic when attending a conference for an 
organization dedicated to supporting the English teaching field in Japan. In 
response to the increase in contingent hiring practices, a subgroup of English 
teaching activists (all of whom appeared to be white men) devoted one 
conference session to developing a proposal that the organization “should not 
advertise dispatch or outsourced positions” for secondary and tertiary education, 
“to encourage quality in education.”31 They also developed a proposal for 
excluding advertisements that stated race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, or age 
requirements for employment. The most well-known activist in the room, a 
white man originally from the United States, suggested that “native speaker” 
be added to this list, because, as he explained, “there are some places that 
won’t accept people unless they’re from white countries,” and these employers 
use the “native speaker” category to justify their racial discrimination. While 
this clumsy reference to “white countries” emphasizes the racialization of 
postcolonial spaces and reproduces the common erasure of racial diversity 
within western countries, it does so in the service of antiracist solidarity. Even 
as many people in the room agreed that condemnation of the “native speaker” 
category might disrupt racist, imperial exclusions, a louder (and overlapping) 
constituency argued that the entire employment sector relies on this very 
category for legitimation.
As one attendee pointed out: “Being native English teachers is . . . our 
niche.”32 Others in the room agreed: it is the category that ensures them jobs 
and defines the ineffable skill set that makes them desirable and different 
from Japanese teachers of English. Even when these white men ostensibly 
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wanted to stand in solidarity with Filipina/o and other postcolonial subjects, 
the structure of colonial mimicry extended out to construct English-fluent 
Japanese subjects also as menace. Such an expansion of the sphere of perceived 
threat indexes the temporal contradictions at the heart of the “post-colonial.”33 
While this terminology can simplistically relegate the colonial era to the past 
and define colonized spaces as those that were once objects of territorialized 
control, many scholars argue that the seemingly deterritorialized rubric of 
neoliberal globalization allows for colonialism of a different but structurally 
continuous variety.34 If Japan “is still under the colonial domination” of the 
United States and global English-language dominance is characteristic of 
“linguistic imperialism,”35 then English-fluent Japanese can also be imagined 
as a “menace” within the terms of colonial mimicry.
The proposal to add “native English speaker” to the list of unacceptable 
categories for job advertisements was shot down. Despite their stated desire 
to stand in solidarity with Filipina/o, Jamaicans, Indians, and other English 
speakers from racialized former colonies, the embeddedness of the English 
language industry within continuing imperial dynamics meant that standing in 
solidarity would undermine these white men’s authority in other, even more 
threatening ways. Japanese English teachers in Japan, after all, far outnumber 
potential job competitors from countries like the Philippines. Again, the sphere 
of the “say-able” is circumscribed by the very logic of colonial mimicry, which 
calls for Japanese subjects to be students of English, while fearing those who 
might master the language enough to themselves become teachers.
The limitations of these efforts to include Filipina/o—both at the level of 
individual gatekeepers like Gabe and at the level of institutional policy—highlight 
the racial contradictions at the heart of both “benevolent assimilation” policies and 
(neo)liberal aspirations to market neutrality and equality. The English-language 
education system established in the Philippines under U.S. colonial direction was 
meant to produce racialized mimic subjects who inhabited a clear racial hierarchy 
of “not quite/not white.”36 Despite and because of this hierarchy, U.S. colonial 
efforts were envisioned as compassionate. As these white men in contemporary 
Japan attempt to (provisionally, haltingly) open up the English industry to 
postcolonial subjects, they are still positioned as “benevolent” patriarchs. The line 
where, out of economic self-interest, they partially back away from this stance 
of “benevolence” overtly marks the continuing importance of racial hierarchy 
within neoliberal relations. Indeed, in both attempts at postcolonial inclusiveness 
and invocations of Filipina threat we can see how the legacies of benevolent 
assimilation haunt contemporary neoliberal relations.
Rerouting the Return of the Colonial Oppressed
When Filipina English teachers are the focus of yellow peril discourses, 
their credentials—procured within the Philippines’ U.S.-model education 
system—serve as prime indicators of their mastery and potential threat. Chris, 
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in the quotation that opens this article, contradictorily assumes that the Filipinas 
with “master’s degrees” and “experience” who had applied for his well-paid 
elementary school job would actually be willing to work for so much less. I 
heard a similar invocation while attending an expatriate business meeting 
targeted at aspiring foreign entrepreneurs. In a pitch for the importance of self-
employment, a white, U.S. owner of an international preschool warned the 
audience, which was mostly “native English teacher” men, about his changing 
applicant pool. Filipinas with master’s degrees in childhood education were now 
applying for the positions that he usually offered to inexperienced young people 
fresh out of undergraduate institutions in North America, Britain, Australia, and 
New Zealand.37 In these invocations of credentials and work experience, the 
historical feminization and devaluation of early childhood education careers 
intersects with Filipina postcolonial status to quietly amplify anxieties about 
decreased wages. Multiple feminizations, of postcolonial subjects and of care 
work, come together to naturalize the idea that Filipinas work for, in Chris’s 
words, “chickenfeed.”
Because it was omitted from his presentation for the aspiring businessmen, I 
learned only later in a one-on-one conversation with him that the preschool owner 
had never actually hired any of the Filipinas who applied for jobs at his school. 
He explained sheepishly that, despite their excellent credentials, he had not felt 
comfortable with the Filipina applicants because of difficulty understanding 
their accents and a concern with “cultural differences”—especially potential 
complications to his set curriculum around holidays and national celebrations. 
In this “partial representation/recognition of the colonial object,”38 Filipinas are 
represented as threat (when described in front of an audience of mostly white 
English teachers) while in reality their presumed threat has not been allowed to 
come to fruition. Indeed, all the men I spoke with who invoked these discourses 
were themselves (still) gainfully employed. The constant deferral of peril into the 
(imagined) future indexes a key structural component of “race panic.”39 The most 
perilous consequences foretold are constantly deferred, thus fueling the cyclical 
reproduction of the discourse.
With these invocations of educational background, Filipina English 
teachers in Japan are implicitly cast as (potentially) benefiting from colonial 
era “benevolent assimilation” policies. The entry of Filipinas into the English 
language industry figures as a potent “return of the colonial oppressed,” with 
Filipinas deploying the lessons of colonialism (i.e., English fluency) against 
their former masters.40 This Freudian turn of phrase simultaneously evokes the 
affective (often fantastical) nature of yellow peril and the transnational mobility 
(the “return”) that spurs its contemporary invocations. As scholars within 
Filipino American studies have shown, the remainders of U.S. colonial policies 
are key to understanding the transnational mobility of Filipino workers within 
neoliberal globalization. Colonial education regimes not only “produced a kind 
of culture of migration among many Filipinos,”41 but Philippine government 
agencies actively market Filipino workers to migrant-receiving countries with 
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promises that “American colonial education adequately served its purpose 
and even exceeded it.”42 Such celebratory framings of U.S. intervention in the 
Philippines papers over both past imperial violence and continuing capitalist 
exploitation. Instead of focusing attention on how the “return” continues to 
hierarchically position Filipina migrants as exploitable labor, my informants’ 
invocations of credentials implicitly emphasize what Vicente Rafael calls 
“white love”—the myth of U.S. colonial benevolence—by framing the U.S.-
model education system as a gift that supposedly keeps giving.43
Within the broader context of Japan’s English industry, the traces of U.S. 
colonial policies and their unexpected reroutings and “returns” were perhaps 
most visible in what was by far the cheapest option for commercial English 
language instruction I encountered: lessons via Skype video conferencing. An 
Internet search in Japanese for “Learn English by Skype” brings up an array 
of businesses of this type, and the websites routinely emphasize that they hire 
“mostly current students and graduates of the University of the Philippines.”44 
During my fieldwork at an expatriate bar I met a middle-aged Japanese engineer 
who actually owned one of these offshore English schools, which charged 
Japanese students 137 yen (U.S. $1.56) per 25-minute lesson with English-
fluent Filipinas in Manila.45 He described how he had bought the business 
without ever traveling to the Philippines and was still quite confused by the 
dynamics behind it: “All the women studied nursing, every application, nursing, 
nursing,” he explained while presenting exaggerated gestures for filling out and 
submitting paperwork. “I don’t understand!”46
This moment of confusion highlights the kinds of misrecognitions that can 
happen when different postcolonial dynamics rub up against each other. These 
professions —nursing and in-home English instruction—seemed like odd 
bedfellows to the Japanese business owner. However, both are characterized 
by intimate encounters, as Filipinas service and care for the needs and desires 
of their English students and their patients, often at radically undervalued 
salaries. Indeed, the Skype English lesson provides an uncanny example of how 
“colonialism sustains relations of intimacy across great distances.”47 Teaching 
English to Japanese students represents a geographic and professional rerouting 
of what Catherine Ceniza Choy calls an “empire of care.”48 While Choy argues 
that U.S. colonial policies created the conditions for mass migration of Filipina 
nurses to the United States,49 instead of moving to the United States some 
would-be nurses are filling outsourced positions in Japan’s diversifying English 
teaching industry and filling them at salaries far below what could fulfill 
even the most basic living standards in the Global North.50 This rerouting of 
employment also maps onto the multiplicity of postcolonial relations at work 
within this triangulated relationship. While both the Philippines and Japan 
have been subject to paternalizing U.S. control (through colonization and 
Occupation, respectively), the World War II history of Japanese colonization of 
the Philippines and Japan’s continuing economic dominance across the region 
creates multiple colonial subject positions for Filipina English teachers.51
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Feminizations and Fears of White Emasculation
Following the insights of both humanities and social science scholars, we 
can see how “feminization,” as a devaluation process, shapes these transnational 
labor economies in a variety of ways. Perhaps most obviously for this case, we 
should be reminded of the gendering of Euro-American colonial expansion, 
which cast (post)colonial spaces and peoples as feminine and, therefore, in need 
of white masculine intervention and authority.52 Sociologists would point us 
to theories of workforce “feminization”—the systematic process of economic 
devaluation that often accompanies the influx of women workers into male-
dominated professions.53 Finally, Asian American studies scholarship would 
remind us of how these two forms of “feminization,” within labor and colonial 
relations, come together in the history of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century yellow peril discourses in the United States, with Asian/American men 
cast as feminized threats to the work and livelihood of white men.54 Together 
these various gender dynamics provide a thick discursive backdrop for the 
devaluation of Asian women’s work within the contemporary international 
division of labor.
Although it is true that with “the global expansion of the capitalist mode, 
the racial and gendered character of labor has been further exaggerated, refined, 
and built into the regime itself,”55 paying attention to earlier iterations of yellow 
peril can helpfully render strange the more familiar contemporary dynamics. 
Notably, Asian/American men working on the U.S. mainland in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s were both feminized and imagined as not properly “American.” 
Nativist rhetoric, like that seen on an American Federation of Labor brochure 
from 1902, contrasted “American Manhood Against Asiatic Coolieism,” 
sensationally asking “Which Shall Survive?”56 National union leaders at the 
time, like Samuel Gompers, argued that “Every incoming coolie means the 
displacement of an American, and the lowering of the American standard of 
living.”57 The rhetorical structure of debates about who gets to count as a “native 
English teacher” in contemporary Japan relies on similar “nativist” logics and 
narratives of masculinized whiteness (“American manhood”) being overtaken 
by a feminized Asia. While nineteenth-century yellow peril aimed to “protect” 
the racial purity and livelihood of the white male working class within the 
borders of the United States, this instance within contemporary Japan updates 
the discourse for a neoliberal era of multidirectional transnational mobility.
Integral to this analysis is not only the mobility of U.S. and Filipina bodies 
relocating to Japan, but also the accompanying movement and recombinant 
mutability of masculinity discourses. Research within U.S. masculinity 
studies has illuminated how the socioeconomic changes wrought by the rise 
of neoliberal globalization have been central to the construction of white men 
as victims within the domestic U.S. cultural wars of the past forty years.58 As 
Hamilton Carroll argues, in the wake of “erosions of masculinist privilege 
at both the global and the national levels,” many “white men [in the United 
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States] place responsibility for a broad series of shifts in labor opportunity at 
the feet of the women and people of color who have displaced them.”59 While 
my informants in Japan rarely espoused the kind of blatantly antifeminist, 
anti–civil rights backlash common in the U.S. cultural wars, “the coloniality 
of Western liberalism” means that even left-leaning condemnations of injustice 
easily slip from a focus on economic systems to a concern with threats to white 
masculinity.60
These slippages were especially potent among the population of men who 
imagined themselves as “long termers” in Japan. Most U.S. migrants teach 
English in Japan only for the short term—enjoying a few years of “adventure” 
living abroad before returning home—and therefore express less concern about 
the increasing flexibilization of labor there. It is the long-term male residents, 
on the other hand, who often envisioned neoliberal labor policies as threatening 
to undermine their successful performance of breadwinner masculinity. Hetero-
centric gender expectations informed men’s anxieties about their ability to 
support current or imagined future families in Japan. For example, Dan, a soft-
spoken white man from California who I first met at the aforementioned union 
meeting, explained during our interview that he joined the union because he 
questioned the legality of the privatization of public school English teachers, 
but he also quickly noted that gender expectations provided a more personalized 
motivator. His small salary as an outsourced employee had upset both his and his 
Japanese wife’s assumptions about gender roles and had caused friction within 
his marriage. Although he lamented that his wife sometimes openly resented 
how low his financial contributions to the household were, he also admitted his 
own discomfort: “It’s a little embarrassing to have your wife making so much 
more than you—almost three times as much.”61
Another advocate for direct hire similarly referenced gender norms when 
explaining his non-union-affiliated activism: “There’s a lot of people [native 
English teachers] who are living locally that have families. They’re—the 
majority of them are male—they have married Japanese women. They’re being 
expected to have jobs and sustain their family because of the cultural issues of, 
you know, ‘man has job’” and outsourced hiring schemes make this difficult 
for them.62 The “cultural issues” that Tom references here are, of course, much 
more complex than just “man has job,” a knowingly simplified phrase meant to 
index expectations that heterosexual married men have not just any job but a 
job that will provide a stable, household income, slotting the family into Japan’s 
“male-breadwinner type of reproductive bargain.”63
Feminist scholars have pointed out that it is precisely this reproductive 
bargain that helped produce irregular, contingent employment as a feminized 
realm in Japan in the first place. Official government policies have encouraged 
these structures, in that tax exemptions and welfare benefits accrue to married 
households where the wife’s income does not exceed 1,000,000 yen a year.64 In 
the wake of the introduction of regulated dispatch labor in the 1980s and then 
the bursting of the economic bubble in the early 1990s, Japanese women’s share 
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of the temporary agency workforce decreased from a staggering 95% to a still 
high 80% by the turn of the century.65 As these hiring schemes have continued 
to expand and include more and more men, the most vulnerable are Japanese 
youth, ethnic minorities, and foreigners.
Possessive Investments in Transnational White Privilege
For white men who are critical of these broader changes in employment 
trends and ostensibly desiring of social justice, together structural positioning 
and personal investments in privilege produce contradictory political analyses. 
One informant who was not a union member but identified as “far Left,” 
provided a particularly ambivalent self-reflexive analysis of transnational white 
privilege. Kyle, a white Midwestern man in his mid-twenties, had been in 
Japan for only a few years when I interviewed him. Unlike most recent arrivals, 
however, he was already fluent in the language, married to a Japanese woman, 
and imagining a future that would be inextricably defined by his connections 
to the country. His analysis begins from an overt recognition of a racialized 
“unfair advantage” that white English speakers experience in Japan’s labor 
market and globally:
I think there is an unfair advantage to people who are white 
and speak English to . . . be able to find a job, some kind 
of job, whether it’s teaching English or whatever, almost 
anywhere in the world. . . . a lot of people, especially in Japan, 
. . . their job and their life is almost based on that weird unfair 
advantage, and that’s eventually going to change. . . . In 
thirty years, fifty years, it’s no longer going to be considered 
a social asset to be white and American.66
As was usually true, Kyle found it difficult to tease out the difference 
between privileges granted based on race, linguistic ability, and nationality, but, 
unlike most informants, he posits these associations and their ability to amplify 
transnational employability as decidedly unnatural or, in his words, “weird.” 
By maintaining that for most English-speaking, white migrants in Japan, “their 
job and their life is almost based on that weird unfair advantage,” Kyle’s initial 
analysis foreshadows a repetitive discomfort about the moral grounds upon 
which his own livelihood is based. Though initially using third person, referring 
to migrants like himself in general, he later overtly includes himself as part of 
a group that, despite their lack of “specific marketable skills,” are still able to 
“get good jobs and make good money.”67
By relying on a deferred temporality that places the loss of white privilege 
in the future, “thirty years, fifty years” from now, Kyle’s analysis reveals the 
racial limitations of his leftist critique. While he implies that his predicted 
changes would make for a “fairer” world, he also fears that this “fairer” world 
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will be his own undoing. In other words, he simultaneously frames his vision 
of imminent racial justice as a menacing future of lost white privilege. In his 
critique of neoliberal labor trends, for instance, he envisions people like himself 
as the biggest losers:
I just don’t know where people are going to find jobs [twenty 
years from now]. I think it’s really scary and I think that people 
who are going to . . . bear the brunt of that are people with the 
liberal arts education from western countries. Because, if you 
don’t have a very specific thing that you can do very well, I 
don’t know if there is really going to be a place for you in the 
labor market.68
 
In this imagined future, old structures of inequality based on race and nationality 
fall apart. Stripped of social identifications and defined only in market terms, 
workers in Kyle’s vision become what Foucault, in his analysis of neoliberal 
subjectivity, calls “abilities-machines.”69 Humanities education, with its failure 
to reduce students to mere “human capital,” will not fail everyone equally in 
this scenario. As people like himself are pushed out of well-paying jobs, others 
will supposedly “happily” take their place at lower wages:
Kyle: There’s no reason that. . . . I’m trying to think of 
another country where they speak pretty standard English, 
where most people aren’t Caucasian . . .
Christina: Singapore?
Kyle: Yeah, like Singapore. There is no reason . . . [pause] I 
mean a lot of people in the Philippines speak perfect English 
too. There’s no reason you couldn’t have Filipino ALTs 
[native English teachers in Japan’s public schools] and pay 
them half as much money. You know that they’d be happy to 
come here and work for that.70
 
Despite my initial referencing of the financial powerhouse of Singapore, 
Kyle quickly changed his focus to the Philippines. This geographic rerouting 
highlights the important role that North-South economic inequality plays in 
this version of yellow peril—these divides shore up assumptions that “Other” 
English-speaking migrants would be willing to work for less than the current 
going rate. The stark socioeconomic inequalities between western English-
speaking countries and the Philippines was necessary to validate Kyle’s 
presumptuous predictions about what Filipina/os would be “happy” to do. 
In turn, this “happiness” or presumed willingness to be exploited excludes 
Filipina/os and other third world workers from the suffering scripted for 
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western-educated (white) workers. Insisting that it is mostly white workers 
who will “bear the brunt” of neoliberal economic changes positions white pain, 
suffering, and capitalist exploitation as more grievable.
With a stay-at-home wife and a small child, Kyle discussed his dire 
predictions with trepidation. Faced with the impossible decision of choosing 
between his and his family’s well-being or the elimination of what he knows 
to be an unjust social system, he responded with a combination of fatalism and 
bewilderment, repeating throughout his despairing narrative, “I don’t know . . . I 
don’t know.” This is the discomforting vision that results when aspirations to “far 
Left” self-reflexivity get filtered through the prism of neoliberal subjectivity and 
an unexamined “possessive investment in whiteness.”71 Ultimately, he found 
himself incapable of thinking outside of an analytical arc that posits neoliberal 
globalization as the leveling of the playing field. Such an analytical arc obscures 
how actually existing neoliberal globalization has in fact exacerbated global 
inequalities. While neoliberal ideology would have us believe that free markets 
promise economically determined equality—a world in which everyone 
competes on equal terms based on their marketable skills—the distribution and 
recognition of those skills continue to be intricately connected to oppressive 
structures of race, class, nationality, sexuality, and gender.72 Ultimately, Kyle’s 
analysis betrays a willingness to recognize how structures of inequality have 
produced unfair advantages for some, but an overwhelming fear of what 
material redistribution might entail.73
Conclusion
In that racial and gender justice would by definition require a loss of white 
male privilege, some of my informants found the idea of working equally 
alongside Filipinas personally threatening. Instead of envisioning the possibility 
of transnational solidarity and mutual uplift, a world in which Filipinas and 
white U.S. men might share economic imaginaries that prioritize a living wage 
for all, they envisioned a race to the bottom. Within this context, the deceptively 
neutral-sounding “native English speaker” category provides a framework for 
legitimizing imperial race and gender hierarchies by distinguishing between 
postcolonial subjects and U.S. citizens. The overt “nativism” within the 
exclusionary framing of the category attempts to stabilize the ambivalence 
endemic to “colonial mimicry” and stave off fears of white male victimhood. 
The constant postponement of this victimhood into an imagined future also 
produces “a syntax of deferral . . . as a specific colonial temporality” by 
prioritizing the potentially impending pain and exploitation of white U.S. 
bodies over and above actually existing suffering and discrimination against 
racialized postcolonial subjects.74
Following Said’s emphasis on the mobility and transmutability of discourse, 
this article has delineated how the menace of colonial mimicry in combination 
with the racialized and gendered structures of a neoliberal international division 
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of labor has animated a “travelling yellow peril.” This formation reaches 
across multiple borders, accompanying U.S. and Filipina migrants abroad. 
Inasmuch as Filipina “colonial mimicry” undermines the embodied, linguistic 
authority of white “native” English teachers it becomes a discursive conduit 
for the transplantation of the figure of the “white male victim” into Japan. In 
contemporary Japan, the discourse of yellow peril is “almost the same but not 
quite,” in that it echoes earlier iterations but updates them for a neoliberal era 
of multidirectional mobility.75 Traveling yellow peril is mobilized and literally 
made mobile within a changing socioeconomic landscape in which U.S. white 
migrants attempt to negotiate a racialized market niche for themselves abroad 
while dealing with the imagined postraciality and gender neutrality of neoliberal 
logics and the specter of “the return of the colonial oppressed.”
While masculinity studies scholar Hamilton Carroll argues that U.S. white 
male victimhood discourses are “a local (i.e., nationally specific) response to a 
global phenomenon” of neoliberal economic transformation, this case in Japan 
makes it clear that crises of white masculinity are not limited to the domestic 
United States.76 It may be true that “the national is still the level on which such 
transformations are most commonly felt, negotiated, and understood,”77 but it is 
imperative that we understand how the gendered and racialized anxieties endemic 
to neoliberal globalization are produced and experienced transnationally as 
well. Similarly, most analyses of “the return of the colonial oppressed” focus 
on the geographic movement of former-colonial subjects to the metropole,78 but 
the return can also be triangulated, rather than geographically direct. Hence, the 
colonial legacies of U.S. “benevolent assimilation” policies in the Philippines 
reappear within Japan’s neoliberal labor regimes to position Filipina migrants 
as a menace to the reproduction of U.S. white hetero-masculinities abroad. This 
case of yellow peril in Japan’s English teaching industry highlights the tenacity 
and geographic flexibility of yellow peril discourse. Whether the threat to white 
masculinity is experienced within the U.S. or by migrants within Asia itself, 
“The future is uncertain once again, always.”79
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